ooosociety in times of decision or crisis.

554 Individual status also improved with education, more particularly with the attainment of a degree in the official examinations and appointment to official position. An individual's educational or official career was usually dependent on the willingness and ability of the family to support him during a long period of study. A particularly promising youngster of a poor family might occasionally be underwritten by the clan or village. Whatever his means of financial support, his success in the examinations was a reflection of proper upbringing and honored his family and, to a lesser extent, his clan and village almost as much as himself. The wealth usually accumulated by an official during his career also materially enhanced the village and clan as well as the family. For these reasons, reflected glory accrued to the kin of an illustrious scholar or official for generations after his death.

C. Political Role

• 829 To a remarkable extent, the Chinese imperial system operated by moral suasion with a minimum use of force and without a developed, codified system of law. This achievement was made possible through the state's utilization of the family as a training ground for loyalty to the state and the virtues prized by it as part of the machinery of government. The root virtue of

filial piety was extolled above all others in the Confucian system. It denoted not only the obedience and devotion of the son to his father, but of the younger to the elder, and of the subject to the ruler.

Two types of organizations built on the foundation of the family were utilized by the state in maintaining peace and uniformity throughout the empire. One was the clan, or tsu. It bound together families with a common ancestor to promote their security and advancement. Relying for strength on the maximizing and formalizing of kinship ties, the tsu reinforced the authority of the family head and the values he imparted to the younger generation. The tsu settled disputes between families, conducted ancestor rites for any member of a family whose line died out, provided help and protection in times of trouble for the lower class members, and safeguarded the social and economic position of the well-to-do. Where the tsu was strong, it governed the village with little interference from the central government, except in matters of high crime and taxes. The advantages to the Confucian state of the tsu were deemed sufficient to compensate for its encroachment on the state's jurisdiction.[5]

In gathering together all the members of

5. On the clan see Hu Hsien-chin, The Common Descent Group in China and Its Functions (Viking Fund Publications in Anthropology no. 10), New York, The Viking Fund, Inc., 1948.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF12 North China AF12

178 foreign firms or government services headed by
596 foreigners. Their prohibition against officers hiring or recommending relatives was only beginning to be copied by wholly Chinese institutions such as banks, factories, and schools in the years before World War II. Where the employment of relatives was forbidden, friendship, a common birthplace, training in the same school, or membership in the same secret society often provided the basis for a personal link between an employer and a prospective employee and for the rise of cliques in business and government offices.

Scattered surveys of various strata of the population in industrial areas indicate that only at the upper managerial or owner level, where the facts of economic operation were most pressing, was the majority in favor of impersonal, rational selection of employees. Even in modern colleges, only about half the students appeared to favor that choice. With each successively lower economic level, the preference was more overwhelmingly for selection on the basis of kinship.[7]

F. Effect on Social and Political Role

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With the collapse of the imperial system in 1912, the family was no longer fitted to serve

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7. Ibid., pp. 186-89.

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as the social and political training ground of China. The political parties and modern schools, particularly the colleges and universities, now began to train youth for the new political world which was coming into being after 1911. No comparable institutions existed to inculcate in youth a moral and ethical code that would serve as a common guide in the new society. Attempts by the Kuomintang leaders during the period of the National Government to restore filial piety along with a revised Confucian code to the service of an increasingly authoritarian-minded state met with failure among the nation's youth.[8]

IV. THE FAMILY UNDER COMMUNISM

A. The Marriage Law

In reconstructing Chinese society, the Communist regime has undertaken to change the nature and function of the family. The first step in this direction was the new Marriage Law promulgated in May 1950. It is one of the three legal pillars of the state. The other two -- the Labor Union Law and the Land Reform Law -- were announced at a later date but put into effect within a much shorter time and with greater success.

8. Mary C. Wright, "From Revolution to Restoration: The Transformation of Kuomintang Ideology," Far Eastern Quarterly, August, 1955, pp. 515-32.

the response of others [the group]: this is -- or is not -- individualism."[43] 183 577

The last sentence quoted above introduces the notion of group criticism and group pressure, which is the universal Communist device for fostering approved behavior and eliminating the disapproved. Members of Party organizations, professions, government bureaus, and all other groups meet continually for criticism and self-criticism, and this whole process reaches the population through the publication of confessions and criticism in the mass media. The study meetings, popularly called "struggle meetings," are characterized by an atmosphere of tension and fear. Confessions of deviation or defect are made by individuals and analyzed or "exposed" by the group; criticisms are leveled at individuals and promises of reform are exacted.[44] This appears to be a device of deadly effectiveness for making individuals conform to the new Communist standards for thought and behavior.

B. Time, Change, and Causation 829

In traditional China, time and change were

42. Cf. Raymond Bauer, The New Man in Soviet Psychology, Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1952, p. 164 and passim. The quotations are from Jerome Bruner's foreword to this volume, xxii.

43. Lun Tang Yu Ko-jen [On the Party and the Individual], cited in Nivison, op.cit., pp.45-46, and note 66.

regarded as cyclical. Out of their careful adjustment to the seasonal and recurrent rhythms of Nature, Chinese-farmer-thinkers developed a notion of time and change which they applied to the course of individual lives, to changes in political life, to history as a whole. In the life of man, old age was not seen as the end of the line, but as a return to childhood; not in the sense of "second childhood," but as having come full round from the freedom of childhood to the freedom of old age. In political thinking at all levels a notion of the cycle is present. Dynasties, like men and animals, were regarded as having a natural life, from birth, through growth, to maturity, senescence, and death; these phases differed in length but the cycle was never broken. Integration and disintegration followed one another as day followed night. The opening line of the most widely read Chinese classic novel states this prevailing belief: "When empire has long been divided, it will invariably be unified; when it has long been unified, it will invariably be divided."[45]

The Communists seek to extirpate this age-old attitude and substitute for it the modern western idea of straight-line progress. For them the future is not to be a return to the past but the attainment, through protracted struggle, of a Communist world utopia. Textbook Party handbooks, and all other media insist on this new and revolutionary idea of time and change. This dynamic straight - line change

45. San-kuo Chih Yen-i [The Romance of the Three Kingdoms], translated by Prewitt-Taylor.

is typically and authoritatively expressed by Liu Shao-ch'i:

> "It is in the course of the long struggle of men as social beings against nature, that men's physical forms..., their social relations, their forms of social organization as well as their brains, ideology, etc., are all continuously being changed and improved...."[46]

The traditional Chinese view of causation was related to their views of time and change. Sequences of events were seen to have a certain regularity, but not that of cause and effect. Night follows day--but day is not the cause of night.[47] Through education one learned how to identify situations and to know the sorts of things that might happen. One learned to place oneself advantageously in a sequence of situations. The Communists seek to replace this older view with the Marxist idea of causation. A student is to learn the Marxist laws of social development, that certain causes always bring certain effects, and that when one has mastered the laws of causation, one can really participate in bringing about the desired and inevitable results.

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46. Liu Shao-ch'i, "On the Training of the Communist Party Member." For this passage, cf. Current Background, No. , p. 3.

47. Bunzel-Weakland, p. 31.

829 The Communist effort to replace the old attitudes toward time, change, and causation with new ones has tremendous implications. It seeks to destroy any tinge of fatalism, any inclination toward resignation, and to foster in the individual a restless search for the goals set by the Party.

C. Work and Leisure

461 In traditional China, leisure was seen as a time for replenishment of bodily and psychic energy; leisure was necessary if one were not to suffer depletion of vital forces.[48] Abundant leisure was also important evidence of membership in the favored social class. In Communist China, work and vigorous activity are given a high value; hard work and ceaseless struggle are characteristic of all the "models" held up before the people in all the propaganda media. The ceaseless activity of the top leaders is meant to set a pattern for those who follow them. Leisure as a contemplative bodily replenishment is devaluated, and active sports which develop competitive spirit are being promoted. Leisure as a mark of high status has disappeared.

D. Authority and the Individual

156 829 The father's relation to his sons was the model for the exercise of authority in traditional China. Ideally, the father was to be firm and aloof, seeing to it rather impersonally that his children were well cared for and given proper instruction.

48. Ibid., pp. 37-40.

156 The son was to submit unquestioningly to his
● 89 father's will at all times. He had no independence of judgment or action until after his father's death. The son's loyalty and devotion were also to show themselves in providing for the father's comfort in old age, in arranging a proper funeral and burial, and in periodic offerings to his father's tablet in the ancestral hall of the family.

In the political sphere the emperor was the "father" of his people, and the key local magistrates of the imperial bureaucracy were often referred to as the "Fathers and Mothers of the People." To reciprocate the care and concern of those in authority, the people were to provide material support through taxes and labor; they were to serve their masters loyally and submissively; they were to obey the rules which custom (personalized as the wise rulers of the past) and the laws laid down for them. And in those laws the heaviest punishments were decreed for those who showed unfilial behavior in the family, or, in its political counterpart, rebellion against the state.[49]

These were the patterns of authority to which the individual was subject. His personality

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49. The Classic of Filial Piety says: "Of the 3,000 crimes punishable by the five punishments, none is greater than unfiliality." (i.e., failure to submit to authority.) For a discussion, cf. Etienne Balazs, Le Traite Juridique de Souei-chou, Paris, 1954, p. 144.

156 was formed within the family; his status in society
829 was determined by his family's status. To understand the individual of traditional China, we must see him within this setting; to understand the changes being wrought by the Communists, we must take into account some of the tensions and dissatisfactions which the family system -- particularly in its period of decay -- set up in the individual.

The role of the individual was determined by his position in the family, and he was taught to fill that particular role. For example, an older brother was responsible for his younger brother, and was taught to be nice in play to those younger in years. The younger sons were expected to be less sober and responsible; their mothers often spoiled them. Throughout all the complex relations of the family, roles were assigned and the individual's life and character were formed by the role he played. Freedom of choice and freedom to develop individuality were thus rigidly limited.[50]

The well-being of the family group was the individual's prime concern. He was committed to work which would assure the family's prosperity; he was obliged to protect the family's reputation, for example, by paying off the gambling debts of a family member rather than have the family disgraced; to continue to live in a tense and unhappy household rather than to break away and thereby weaken the family's solidarity.

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50. Bunzel-Weakland, pp. 47-64.

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829 In exchange for his submission to authority and discipline in every phase of his personal life, the individual was given the basic necessities of life and the help of the family's influence in obtaining jobs, and in obtaining a bridge, etc. Nepotism was sanctioned by the classics, and family members benefited when one of them rose to wealth or power.

The only social relationship which an individual could enjoy with less family interference was friendship, which was the most cherished thing in life. Many a Chinese poet has dealt with this theme. Popular novels and dramas have treated it with vividness and force. Friendship has the overtones of the elder-brother, younger-brother relationship. As John Weakland has observed, this type of relationship between individuals, self-elected, with virtual equality between the participants, is a refuge from the father-dominated, rigid hierarchy of the family.[51]

The two patterns -- paternal domination and fraternal association -- are reflected in political life. Established governmental authority is of the paternal type; everyone is subject to the will of the emperor-father. But dissident movements are organized on the basis of the brotherly friendship pattern; the romantic rebels of Chinese novels, the organization of bandit gangs, the leadership of rebel armies are all bound together by ties of friendship and blood brotherhood.

When the old social order began to break up under the impact of modern forces, the family

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51. Ibid., pp. 137-47.

156 829 system was undermined and began slowly to disintegrate. Chinese critics held that the old family stifled individuality, prevented the development of individual initiative vital to modern China, and that it was a breeding ground for authoritarianism, hindering the development of democratic citizenship. They also felt that a new kind of individual was needed, and that the family system prevented its birth.[52]

The Communists are developing a new image of the individual and a new relationship between the individual and authority; doing this they are using certain of the old family ideas and, capitalizing on dissatisfaction with the old family system, they are releasing the individual from his bonds and pushing him into a new system of human relations.

The Communists have paid particular attention to the groups which suffered most under the old family: women, particularly younger women, such as daughters-in-law, and adolescents. Bitter denunciations of the tyranny of the old family system by dramatizing its inequities, insistence on the individual's loyalty to the Party rather than to the family -- all these are being resorted to in order to create new individuals suited to the needs of a Communist society. In Communist literature this new type of individual, free of the family and its "feudal" relationships, is presented as having boundless opportunities for self-development. Stories

52. Cf. Theodore Chen, "New China, New Texts," Current History, No. 19, 1950, p. 325.

156 of young "heroes" who have broken away -- some-
829 times denouncing their "reactionary" fathers -- and gone on to make striking contributions to state and society are glorified in almost every publication.

"Comradeship," the brother-friend type of relationship, is strongly emphasized in Party and other organizations. During the long years of their suppression, the Communist leadership was bound together by "comradeship," which is continually romanticized and extolled in textbooks and other writings. This pattern of human relationships is built on an age-old Chinese ideal and is most attractive to those who suffered most under the old family system. It is used to encourage co-operation between individuals in a common task. In the textbooks it is fostered by moral tales -- a pail of water is too heavy for Little Brother and too heavy for Big Brother, but it is easily carried by the two; a lone tree is easily shaken by the wind, but many trees standing together can withstand a heavy wind.[53]

The brotherhood-friendship pattern among top Communist leadership has subtly shifted, and Mao and the Party have begun to exercise paternal authority over subordinates, and the people as a whole. Mao has taken on many of the attributes of the supreme patriarchal emperors of old; his paternal guidance is praised in these lines from an officially published song:

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53. Ibid.

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The great leader is like a father,
Mao Tse-tung educates us.....[54]

Another praises his eternal care for his people:

In loving care for the people
He surpasses that of their own
fathers and mothers.[55]

And, in a children's song, his paternal care and affection are invoked while he is likened to the pole star -- one of the old symbols of the emperor's supremacy:

The northern pole star in the sky --
In China, Mao Tse-tung --
Saving Mankind,
Loving little children.
He'll destroy Chiang's dirty rats.[56]

As Mao takes on more and more attributes of the father, the Party and the state take over both the functions and the emotional focus once supplied by the family. A labor heroine is described as

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54. From a song in Chieh-fang Ko-sheng [Liberation songs], No. 2, 1949, p. 9.

55. From a song in K'ang-mei Yuan-ch'ao Hsiao-t'iao chi [A Collection of Resist-America-Aid-Korea Songs], Wu-han t'ung-su ch'u pan-she, Wukan, 1951, p. 60.

56. From a song in Nung-ts'un Ko-yao Hsüan-chi [A Song Collection of Rural Themes], Hsin-hua ch'u-pan-she, 1950, p. 24.

156 829 "a good daughter of the Party."[57] A song says

Our great fatherland --
We should pay it the same filial
reverence,
As we would show to our mothers.[58]

These quotations suggest the reorientation of loyalties away from the family, but note that the terms and images used are those of the family system itself -- a typical example of the Communist use of the old order to destroy the old order. The functions of the traditional extended family are divided among the Party, the state, and the new type conjugal family. The individual, not the family, now chooses his mate -- often with "advice from Party comrades," and the state, not the family, sanctions the match.[59] The child is taught to rely on himself rather than on his relatives, and state nurseries take over, for many parents, the function of child care.[60] In illness

57. Cf. Jen-min Hua-pao [People's Pictorial], Vol. 2, No. 2, 1951.

58. In Ch'ang-chiang Ko-sheng [Yangtze Songs], No. 7, Hsin-hua ch'u-pan she, Wuhan Branch, Wuhan, 1950, p. 15.

59. Cf. Lindbeck, op.cit., pp. 140-41.

60. The poem "Wen Pao-pao ["Ask Baby"] appeared in lower primary grade textbook in 1950. It has baby asking for various members of the family to carry him. But each member is busy at a separate task: hoeing grain, tending a machine, writing speeches, etc., and baby ends by saying, "Everybody has something to do. I'd rather walk alone by holding onto a wall." Translated in Weakland-Bunzel, Appendix B.

one looks to state and Party health agencies, but responsibility for the care of the aged devolves upon the children of the conjugal family.[61] The family's function as an administrative unit for mutual surveillance and responsibility is now eliminated, and each citizen is responsible to the state. Family connections are no longer a means of getting jobs; they are assigned to individuals by state and Party organizations. In this way the Communists undermine what is left of the old family and strike at the age-old evil of nepotism.

Yet, with the shattering of the old family and the assumption of its functions by the state, the individual is still urged by the leadership to work in a disciplined and co-operative way for the larger social group. The following prescription for individual behavior recalls the formulas for the activity of good members of the traditional family.

> Citizens of the People's Republic are expected to engage in labor and productive activities and to place the common good above personal benefit. They must learn to be helpful and co-operative. They must work hard and submit willingly to the discipline of group life. They must always be ready to learn to accept criticism for the purpose of improvement.[62]

It would appear, then, that the Communist government tries to adapt both patterns of individual-group relationship to its purposes. On the one hand it encourage the equal co-operation pattern

[61. and 62. on following page]

associated with the old image of brotherhood and friendship. On the other hand it increasingly subjects each individual to a type of authority that is reminiscent of the old all-powerful father of the family. For certain types of work, for example, team projects carried on by Party cadres, the former may be encouraged as the efficient pattern. But for the masses of the population, submission of the individual to group is the ordained pattern.

E. Face

In traditional China, "face" meant one's moral reputation (lien) and one's accumulated moral and material prestige in the eyes of the community (mien-tzu). One's lien, or moral reputation, was solidified by adherence to the ethnical forms of society in all human dealings. One's mien-tzu could be increased by making important contacts, by acts of conspicuous generosity; but this could be done only within the rôle which society

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61. Cf. Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 973, Jan. 21, 1955, pp. 31-32; "...when parents are counterrevolutionaries, the child should treat them as enemies."

62. Cf. Theodore Chen, op.cit., p. 324, and Weakland-Bunzel, pp. 153-54.

63. Cf. Hsien-chin Hu, "The Chinese Concepts of Face," American Anthropologist, Vol. 46, (1944), pp. 45-64. The word lien is more current in North China than in the Yangtze Valley and the south. In the lower Yangtze Valley, according to Miss Hu (p. 46, note 5), mien-k'ung is used for lien.

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618 578 are the leading figures of the H-clan. Their relations can be characterized as harmonious, but in public appearance as well as in family relations, the school principal is subordinate to his distant uncle, the head of the *pao*. As to the other members of the clan, publicly, they act toward one another as clansmen, but inside their own houses they talk differently. Some of them even make accusations against their clansmen who belong to different families, in front of non-clan villagers and some of our investigators whom they take in as their friends.

608 The system of co-relations so popular throughout China is also found in P'ing-chiao-tsun. We have often heard the villagers say that so-and-so was so-and-so's *kan*-father or *kan*-son. All the kinship terms are employed except that a prefix "kan" 乾 is added to each term. There are rights and obligations among co-relatives.[26] Co-relatives are neither related by blood nor by marriage. Through a certain proper ritual, two persons or two families can be made into co-relatives. The degree of intimacy between co-relatives, however, depends upon factors other than the ritual itself.

609 571 Kinship terms such as "uncle" and "aunt" are extended to non-clan villagers. Nevertheless, this extension is only a matter of courtesy or an expression of very close neighborliness and friendship. No segregation between clansmen and non-clan villagers can be observed. Indeed, non-clan individuals may be taken into the inner circle of social communication while a clansman may be excluded from it. Kinship tie is not very strong in P'ing-chiao-tsun.

571 From one of our investigations, territorial propinquity is an important factor in the matter of non-paid borrowings, e.g., the temporary inter-family borrowings of agricultural implements and household utensils. In many cases, a house-wife borrows fire from her neighbor's stove to cook her family meal.

565 ●829 556 The economic status in terms of the level of living of a family is a very important factor in social intercourse in P'ing-chiao-tsun. The villagers classify their households into three standings: upper, middle and low. There is only one family in the upper class. About one-third of the families belong to the low class. As already indicated previously, the upper family is isolated in the village, and their

26 The system of co-relations in China is in many respects quite comparable with the Pascuan system of ceremonial sponsorship as mentioned in E. H. Spicer, Pascua, A Yaqui Village in Arizona, Chicago, 1940.

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isolation is quite voluntary. The separation between the low and the rest is, however, largely involuntary. The isolation in this case is not quite as complete as that of the rich family.

Social communication is a very subtle factor in human cooperation. As there are so many factors conditioning and, in a way, hindering the process of free communication, P'ing-chiao-tsun is not a very integrated whole. Collective action,[27] if it exists at all, is in need of a sound basis. Thus the principle of political inaction has its root in social communication.

Urbanization

In many respects, the village folks may have their characteristic ways of life; P'ing-chiao-tsun, nevertheless, is a part of the larger community of Peiping, economically, politically and socially.

P'ing-chiao-tsun is at present connected with the city of Peiping by two highways and one railway line.[28] Bus services are available at a distance of four miles and the railway station is about one mile away. No rickshaws are available in the village, but their supply is plentiful in the nearest town about a mile away. Only one bicycle is found and it is the property of the school principal. On business trips, the villagers may use their own carts, hire a rickshaw, or use the railway. On pleasure trips, they prefer to economize their financial resources at the expense of their own organic energy. The time-distance on foot is about two hours to the nearest city-gate. Unless on very special occasions, females have very little chance to see the city. The school principal is the most frequent visitor to the city.

Agricultural products are sold if at all to the agents in the nearest market-town, and very seldom directly to merchants in the city. There are, however, two families in the village which have duck-raising as their occupation. On the days of temple-fairs in the city, the heads of the families with their assistants drive their stock to their customary market-places. These two families have their interests more in the city than in the village. Mr. W-, the head of

27 On general sociological principles of social interaction and collective action, see R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, **Introduction to the Science of Sociology**, Chicago, 1924; also Richard T. LaPiere, **Collective Behavior**, New York, 1938.

28 On the influences of communication agencies upon social life, see M. M. Willey and S. A. Rice **Communication Agencies and Social Life**, New York, 1933.